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ABSTRACT: In 2016, the UK held a referendum in which voters elected to leave the 
EU. The two-year process is already underway. This move is however raising a lot of 
concerns about its implication for environmental regulation in the UK post-Brexit. 
Indeed, these concerns are fuelled by the substantial contribution of the EU to the 
development of environmental law in the UK since the latter became a member of the 
Union in 1973. This article is a contribution to this discourse. It primarily attempts to 
unravel the implications of Brexit for the future of procedural environmental rights in 
the UK, among other related issues that will receive some exposition. It is hoped that 
this will be a step towards understanding more clearly and preparing better for the post-
Brexit era with respect to securing and progressing, as much as possible, procedural 
environmental rights in the UK. 
 
RESUM: El 2016, el Regne Unit va celebrar un referèndum en què els votants van triar 
sortir de la UE. El procés, que durarà dos anys, ja està en marxa. No obstant això, 
aquesta mesura planteja moltes qüestions sobre la implicació en la regulació ambiental 
al Regne Unit després del Brexit. De fet, aquestes preocupacions s'intensifiquen amb la 
contribució substancial de la UE al desenvolupament del dret ambiental al Regne Unit 
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des que aquest es va convertir en membre de la Unió el 1973. Aquest article és una 
contribució a aquest discurs. Intenta desentranyar principalment les implicacions del
 Brexit en el futur dels drets processals del medi ambient al Regne Unit, entre altres 
temes relacionats que també s’hi tractaran en certa manera. S'espera que aquest sigui un 
pas cap a una comprensió més clara i que ens prepari millor per a l'era post-Brexit pel 
que fa a assegurar i avançar, en la mesura que sigui possible, els drets processals del 
medi ambient al Regne Unit. 
 
RESUMEN: En 2016, el Reino Unido celebró un referéndum en el que los votantes 
eligieron salir de la UE. El proceso, que durará dos años, ya está en marcha. Sin 
embargo, esta medida plantea muchas cuestiones sobre su implicación en la regulación 
ambiental en el Reino Unido después del Brexit. De hecho, estas preocupaciones se 
intensifican con la contribución sustancial de la UE al desarrollo del derecho ambiental 
en el Reino Unido desde que este se convirtió en miembro de la Unión en 1973. Este 
artículo es una contribución a este discurso. Intenta desentrañar principalmente las 
implicaciones del Brexit en el futuro de los derechos procesales del medio ambiente en 
el Reino Unido, entre otros temas relacionados que también se trataran en cierta manera. 
Se espera que este sea un paso hacia una comprensión más clara y que nos prepare 
mejor para la era posbrexit con respecto a asegurar y avanzar, en la medida de lo 
posible, los derechos procesales del medio ambiente en el Reino Unido. 
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SUMMARY: I. Introduction. II. Access to Environmental Information. III. Participation in 
Environmental Decision-Making Processes. IV. Access to Justice in Environmental Matters. V. Some 
Cross-Cutting Issues. VI. Conclusion. VII. References. 
 
I. INTRODUCTION  
The result of a referendum held in the United Kingdom (UK) in June 2016 revealed that 
about 52% of voters were in favour of the UK exiting the European Union (EU).1 On 
this basis, the UK government triggered Article 50 of the Treaty of the EU2 – the two-
year process for leaving the EU – and is scheduled to depart the Union in March 
2019.3Whilst these moves formally signify the beginning of the end of the UK’s 
membership of the EU, they equally raise serious concerns about the major implications 
of Brexit4 for the future of environmental law and governance in the UK.5These 
concerns are rightly fuelled by the fact the EU has played a most crucial and profound 
role, since the UK joined the EU in 1973,6 in radically transforming and progressing 
UK environmental law and policy.7 In fact, about 80% of UK environmental legislation 
is said to have their roots in obligations under EU law.8 
Indeed, the potency of EU environmental law is not without some criticism and 
shortcomings. Regrettably, to a substantial extent, EU environmental law is driven, 
shaped – and sometimes restricted – by economic considerations underpinning the 
                                                            
1 ASTHANA, A., QUINN, B. and MASON, R. ‘UK Votes to Leave EU after Dramatic Night Divides 
Nation’, The Guardian, 24 June 2016, available at: 
https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2016/jun/24/britain-votes-for-brexit-eu-referendum-david-cameron. 
2 [2012] OJ C 326/1. 
3 Although the UK is presently making effort to negotiate an addition two-year ‘transition’ period, the 
idea is yet to be accepted by the EU. ASTHANA, A. and MASON, R., ‘Theresa May asks EU for two-
year Brexit Transition Period’, The Guardian, 22 September 2017, available at: 
https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2017/sep/22/theresa-may-asks-eu-for-two-year-brexit-transition-
period. 
4 ‘Brexit’ is a shorthand way of referring to Britain exiting the EU. 
5 See RODGERS, C. ‘ELR opinion issue 3 2016: BREXIT: What implications for land use and the 
natural environment?’, Environmental Law Review, vol. 18, num. 1 2016, p. 187. 
6 See, Treaty concerning the accession of the Kingdom of Denmark, Ireland, the Kingdom of Norway and 
the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland to the European Economic Community and to 
the European Atomic Energy Community [1972] OJ L73/5, Art 2. (Norway decided not to join the Union 
after the treaty was agreed.) 
7 House of Commons Environmental Audits Committee, ‘EU and UK Environmental Policy’ (Third 
Report of Session 2016–17, House of Commons, April 2016) 8-9. 
8 House of Commons Environmental Audits Committee, ‘The Future of the Natural Environment after the 
EU Referendum’ (Sixth Report of Session 2016–17, House of Commons, January 2017) 15. 




single market as much as by an environmentalist agenda.9 It is quite clear that this is 
born out of the EU’s extensive preoccupation with sustainable growth compared with its 
sustainable development agenda.10 Yet, the positive impact of EU environmental law 
and mechanisms in considerably and markedly advancing environment rights and 
protection in the UK is widely hailed and acknowledged. Indeed, there are specific and 
concrete UK examples of wild birds’ protection and diverse habitat conservation, as 
well as significant improvements in air quality, bathing water, waste disposal, among 
other, as a result of the variety of EU Directives applicable to these issues.11 
To be sure, the same can be said of and applies to procedural environmental rights in the 
UK, which constitute the major thematic focus of this article. Undeniably, the public 
right to access information, participate in decision-making and access justice in 
environmental matters have been bolstered over the years by several EU measures either 
obliging states to adopt necessary implementing legal regimes,12 or creating procedures 
conferring and enabling the exercise of those rights beyond the national level.13 Of 
course, the UK (as well as the EU) is party to the UN Economic Commission for 
Europe (UNECE) Convention on Access to Information, Public Participation in 
Decision-Making, and Access to Justice in Environmental Matters14 (Aarhus 
Convention). Therefore, its non-compliance with the provisions of the Convention can 
be tested by the public before the Convention’s Compliance Committee, whose 
recommendations though non-binding, are authoritative interpretations of the 
                                                            
9 LEE, R. G., ‘Always Keep a Hold of the Nurse: British Environmental Law and Exit from the European 
Union’, Journal of Environmental Law, num. 29, 2017, pp. 156 – 158. 
10Ibid. See generally, JACKSON, T., Prosperity without Growth: Economics for a Finite Planet, 
Routledge, 2016. 
11 See THE WILDLIFE TRUST, ‘A Guide to Key European Environmental ‘Directives’’, available at: 
http://www.wildlifetrusts.org/EU-impact; and House of Commons Environmental Audits Committee ob. 
cit., p. 9. 
12 Examples of UK-applicable EU legislation obliging member states to guarantee at the domestic level 
the public right to information, participation in decision-making and access to justice in environmental 
matters, include: Directive 2003/4/EC on public access to environmental information [2003] OJ L41/26; 
Directive 2010/75/EU on industrial emissions (integrated pollution prevention and control) [2010] OJ 
L334/17; and Directive 2011/92/EU on the assessment of the effects of certain public and private projects 
on the environment [2012] OJ L26/1 (as amended). 
13 See for example: European Commission (EC) Regulation No 1367/2006 on the application of the 
provisions of the Aarhus Convention on Access to Information, Public Participation in Decision-making 
and Access to Justice in Environmental Matters to Community institutions and bodies [2006] OJ 
L264/13; and Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) [2012] C 326/01, Art 258, that 
creates an opportunity for public access to justice (in environmental matters) at the EU level through the 
EC and the CJEU. 
14 25 June 1998, 2161 UNTS 447. 






Convention’s provisions which must be taking into consideration by domestic 
authorities and courts in giving effect to the Convention,15 and can also be a source of 
embarrassment to the government.16 However, it is EU laws on the subject that provide 
the ‘hard, [legally] enforceable edge… to the Aarhus Conventions provisions’ that has 
majorly propelled the UK to better observance of the Convention’s norms.17 
Whilst the writings of environmental law scholars have so far focused mostly on the 
implications of Brexit for the future of UK environmental law in general, and 
sometimes heavily on the substantive aspect, this article takes a somewhat different turn 
to the subject.18 The major aim of this article is to critically and specifically reflect on 
the implications of Brexit for procedural environmental rights as they apply to the UK 
and for its benefit. To varying extents and as applicable, the article will unravel the 
restrictions, challenges, uncertainties, as well as opportunities and possibilities which 
Brexit may present to the UK as regards the continued exercise and development of 
procedural environmental rights. It is hoped that this will at least be a step towards 
understanding more clearly and preparing better for the post-Brexit era with respect to 
securing and progressing, as much as possible, procedural environmental rights in the 
UK.  
Already, the UK government has firmly demonstrated its intention to retain or 
incorporate into domestic law all existing UK-applicable EU (environmental) laws 
through its current European Union (Withdrawal) Bill 2017 – 2019.19 Hence, this article 
does not focus on laws and rights covered there under, except to the extent that it raises 
a spectacular issue worth reflecting on. Also, one is mindful of the fact that at the time 
                                                            
15 Decision I/7 Annex XII-37 (UN Doc ECE/MP.PP/2/Add.8).  This is point has been confirmed by the 
UK Supreme Court in the case of Walton v Scottish Ministers [2012] UKSC 44 per Lord Carnwath, para. 
100: ‘Although the [Aarhus] Convention is not part of domestic law as such (except where incorporated 
through European directives), …the decisions of the Committee deserve respect on issues relating to 
standards of public participation.’  
16 REID, C. ‘Procedural Rights’, in CARDESA-SALZMANN, A. and SAVARESI, A. The Implication of 
Brexit for Environmental Law in Scotland, Scottish Universities Legal Network on Europe, December 
2016, pp. 9-10. 
17Ibid.  
18 Apart from other articles used in the course of this work, see the following studies for example: 
BARLOW M. and HADLEY, E. ‘Effects of a Brexit on Environmental Laws: Habitats, Waste, Chemicals 
and Air’, Burges and Salmon, April 2016; IMRIE, C. ‘Scotland After Brexit: Environmental Law’, 
University of Strathclyde International Public Policy Institute, May 2017; TROMANS, S. and BOWDEN, 
P. ‘Brexit and Environmental Law: Exit from the Euratom Treaty and its Environmental Implications’, 
UK Environmental Law Association, July 2017.   
19 Available at: https://services.parliament.uk/bills/2017-19/europeanunionwithdrawal.html. Some aspects 
of this Bill, but not the ‘savings’ aspect, is still currently been debated in the UK Parliament.  




of writing, more detailed negotiations on Brexit are ongoing between the UK 
government and the EU.20 Thus, effort has been made to maintain a broad discussion 
within the ambits of some of the widely accepted and known implications of Brexit for 
the future relationship between the UK and EU laws and institutions.21 That said, the 
analysis below is executed under the three pillars of procedural environmental rights – 
public right to access environmental information, participate in decision-making 
processes, and access justice in environmental matters – with a last major section 
touching on cross-cutting issues that affect all the aforementioned rights.   
 
II. ACCESS TO ENVIRONMENTAL INFORMATION 
The public right and opportunity to access environmental information, as earlier alluded 
to, is an aspect of UK law that has been progressed by EU law over the years. 
Consequently, the expectation is that aspects of this pillar of UK environmental 
procedural rights would be impacted and curbed by UK exist from the EU. However, 
this may not entirely be the case. 
Apart from the fact that the UK is bent on retaining its domestic EU-inspired access to 
environmental information legislation as noted above,22 the UK public will continue to 
have wide access to environmental information held by EU institutions post-Brexit. 
This is on the basis of European Commission (EC) Regulation No 1367/2006 on the 
application of the provisions of the Aarhus Convention on Access to Information, 
Public Participation in Decision-making and Access to Justice in Environmental Matters 
                                                            
20 HUNTER, A. and WHEELER, B., ‘Brexit: All you need to know about the UK leaving the EU’, BBC, 
26 October 2017, available at: http://www.bbc.com/news/uk-politics-32810887.  
21 Of course, no one knows for sure the exact nature of the relationship between the UK and the EU post-
Brexit, or the exact extent to which the UK plans to, or would eventually distance itself from the EU (and 
this should not stop or prevent analysis of the issue). SAVARESI, A. ‘Brexit Scenarios’, in CARDESA-
SALZMANN, A. and SAVARESI, A., ob. cit., pp. 2 – 3. What is however known is that the UK has no 
plan to negotiate an agreement with the EU that will undermine the essence of Brexit in the first place. It 
is taking the stand that ‘Brexit means Brexit’, and that the UK will neither be part of the EU single market 
and customs union nor be subject to core EU institutions anymore as though it were still a member of the 
Union (and it is mainly in this light that the discussion in this paper is executed). See, respectively, the 
full texts of the British Prime Minister’s letter to the European Council president, Donald Tusk, triggering 
Art 50, and her Florence speech setting out the UK’s post-Brexit plans: BBC, ‘Brexit: The UK's letter 
triggering Article 50’, BBC, 29 March 2017, available at: http://www.bbc.com/news/uk-politics-
39431070; and Gov.UK, ‘PM's Florence Speech: A New Era of Cooperation and Partnership between the 
UK and the EU’, Gov.UK, 22 September 2017, available at: 
https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/pms-florence-speech-a-new-era-of-cooperation-and-
partnership-between-the-uk-and-the-eu. 
22 That is, the Environmental Information Regulation 2004 (No. 3391), and the Environmental 
Information (Scotland) Regulations 2004 (No. 520). 






to Community institutions and bodies (Aarhus Regulation),23 which guarantees the right 
of the public24 (without any form of discrimination as to citizenship, nationality or 
domicile) to access environmental information held by EU institutions or bodies.25 
Indeed, the possibility of continued access to EU regional environmental information is 
vital for the UK public and businesses in making broad-based and far-reaching strategic 
decisions. It is also important considering the polycentric nature of environmental issues 
(and the need to understand them), as substantiated by the primary law of ecology that 
‘everything is connected to everything else’,26 and the fact that ‘in nature all ecosystems 
are inextricably intertwined.’27 
However, access to EU chemical-related environmental information appears to be an 
exception to this straightforward continued public right of access to the general EU 
environmental information post-Brexit. Under Aarhus Convention, Parties are softly 
obliged to ‘encourage operators whose activities have a significant impact on the 
environment to inform the public regularly of the environmental impact of their 
activities and products, where appropriate within the framework of voluntary eco-
labelling or eco-auditing schemes or by other means.’28 An EU law which to an extent 
implements this provision is the EC Regulation No 1907/2006/EC concerning the 
Registration, Evaluation, Authorisation and Restriction of Chemicals (REACH).29Part 
of the purpose of this Regulation is ‘to ensure a high level of protection of human health 
and the environment’30 with respect to the handling and use of chemicals. Hence, an 
important element of the regime is its information gathering and communication 
requirement which seeks to ensures that producers, importers and consumers (whether 
users or distributors) have the information they need – ‘relating to health, safety and 
                                                            
23 [2006] OJ L 264/13. This Regulation was adopted to bring the EU as a body in compliance with its 
obligations under the Aarhus Convention, as the EU is a Party to the treaty. 
24 EC Regulation No 1367/2006, Art 2 (1)(b) defines ‘the public’ as ‘one or more natural and legal 
persons, and associations, organisations or groups of such persons.’ 
25 EC Regulation No 1367/2006, Art 1 (1)(a). 
26 See COMMONER, B., The Closing Circle: Confronting the Environmental Crisis, Jonathan Cape Ltd, 
1972, p. 33. 
27 DEHAN, A. ‘An International Environmental Court: Should there be One?’, Touro Journal of 
Transnational Law, num. 2, 1992, p. 31. 
28 Aarhus Convention, Art 5 (6). 
29 [2006] OJ L396/1. 
30 REACH Regulation, Art 1 (1). 




environmental properties, risks and risk management measures’ – to use chemicals 
safely.31 
The European Chemical Agency (ECHA), a creation of the REACH Regulation, is 
charged with implementing this Regulation, including providing information on 
chemicals, among others.32 Apart from information placed online by the ECHA for the 
general public,33 access to others documents held by the ECHA is expressly made 
subject to the provisions of EC Regulation No 1049/2001regarding public access to 
European Parliament, Council and Commission documents34 which only grants the right 
of access to citizens and residents of EU member states.35 However, regarding access to 
environmental information, Article 3 of the Aarhus Regulation has extended the 
application of EC Regulation No 1049/2001 as follows: 
Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001 shall apply to any request by an applicant for access 
to environmental information held by Community institutions and bodies without 
discrimination as to citizenship, nationality or domicile and, in the case of a legal 
person, without discrimination as to where it has its registered seat or effective 
centre of its activities. 
Whilst the above provision seems to preserve the right of the UK public and businesses 
to access environmental information held by the ECHA post-Brexit, it arguably appears 
from Article 120 of the REACH Regulation that the UK government as a non-EU state 
would need to do a bit more – in terms of negotiate and reaching a special agreement 
with the EU – to make that a reality.36 Additionally, to prevent the risk of regulatory 
                                                            
31 European Commission – Environment Directorate General, ‘REACH in Brief’ (October 2007) 10, 
available at: 
http://ec.europa.eu/environment/chemicals/reach/pdf/publications/2007_02_reach_in_brief.pdf. See for 
example also, REACH Regulation, Art 7. 
32 See the ECHA website: https://echa.europa.eu/about-us/who-we-are/mission. 
33 See REACH Regulation, Art 119. 
34 [2006] OJ L 396. 
35 REACH Regulation, Art 118. According to Arts 2 (1) of EC Regulation No 1049/2001, ‘Any citizen of 
the Union, and any natural or legal person residing or having its registered office in a Member State, has a 
right of access to documents of the institutions, subject to the principles, conditions and limits defined in 
this Regulation’. EU institutions, in accordance with Art 2 (2) of EC Regulation No 1049/2001, may 
however ‘grant access to documents to any natural or legal person not residing or not having its registered 
office in a Member State’ on a discretionary basis. And from the definition of ‘documents’ in the Art 3 (a) 
of the Regulation, there is no doubt that it includes environment-related information: ‘‘documents’ shall 
mean any content whatever its medium (written on paper or stored in electronic form or as a sound, visual 
or audiovisual recording) concerning a matter relating to the policies, activities and decisions falling 
within the institution’s sphere of responsibility.’ 
36 Art 120 of REACH Regulation provides thus: ‘Notwithstanding Articles 118 [on access to information] 
and 119 [on electronic public access], information received by the Agency under this Regulation may be 






uncertainty and ensure continued access of UK chemical to EU market and maintain in 
some form the current REACH obligations, especially those pertaining to information 
generation and communication, there will be need for a new UK chemical legislation 
translating, as much as possible, provisions of the REACH Regulation into UK 
domestic law (as the Regulation is at the moment directly applicable to the UK without 
any domestic enactment).37 Such a development, according to scholars like Lee38 and 
Roger,39 would likely also require a new domestic governance structure, including new 
administrative capacity and scientific expertise to make up for the gaps in chemical 
regulation that will unravel post-Brexit.40 
 
III. PARTICIPATION IN ENVIRONMENTAL DECISION-MAKING 
PROCESSES 
 
The opportunity to participate in environmental decision-making processes is another 
procedural area where members of the public and civil society groups in the UK may 
witness some changes post-Brexit. The Aarhus Convention, apart from requiring public 
participation in decisions on specific activities,41 also obliges parties (like the UK) to 
ensure public participation in the preparation of plans, programmes and policies related 
to the environment,42 and during the preparation of all legally binding normative 
                                                                                                                                                                              
disclosed to any government or national authority of a third country or an international organisation in 
accordance with an agreement concluded between the Community and the third party concerned under 
Regulation (EC) No 304/2003 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 28 January 2003 
concerning the export and import of dangerous chemicals (1) or under Article 181a(3) of the Treaty, 
provided that both the following conditions are met: (a) the purpose of the agreement is cooperation on 
the implementation or management of legislation concerning chemicals covered by this Regulation; (b) 
the third party protects the confidential information as mutually agreed. 
37 This is because the UK being a member of the EU did not require domestic legislation to make the 
REACH Regulation operable in the UK, as the latter was directly applicable and binding in the UK. 
Hence, the UK plan of ‘saving’ existing EU law that has been transposed into UK law through the EU 
(Withdrawal) Bill, or the ‘Great Repeal Bill’ as it is popularly called, would require it to make new laws 
where the country had relied on directly applicable EU legislation like the REACH Regulation. See 
SCOTFORD, E. and BOWMAN, M., ‘Brexit and Environmental Law: Challenges and Opportunities’, 
King’s Law Journal, vol. 27, num. 3, 2016, pp. 416-417. 
38LEE, R. G., ob. cit., p. 162. 
39 ROGER, A. ‘Chemicals’, in CARDESA-SALZMANN A. and SAVARESI, A., ob. cit., p. 13. 
40 Indeed, as acknowledged within the UK government, ‘[s]ome legislation will be difficult to transpose 
into UK law, and will require new governance arrangements to be established’. House of Commons 
Environmental Audits Committee, ob. cit., p.  3. 
41 Aarhus Convention, Art 6. 
42Ibid, Art 7. 




rules.43Article 3 (5)44 and (6)45 however establishes that the Convention is ‘a floor, not a 
ceiling’,46 as Parties retain the right to maintain or introduce broader participatory rights 
and opportunities than those obtainable under the Convention. But, as it appears, Brexit 
will cause the UK to ‘backslide’ with respect to maintaining certain EU-enabled public 
rights and opportunities to participate in environment-related decision-making that 
seemingly go beyond the requirements of the Aarhus Convention. 
Under EU arrangements, beyond the preparation of environmental laws, there ‘are the 
routine requirements in EU legislation that government plan the implementation of 
environmental obligations and report on progress. This enables political and legal, 
formal and informal, peer and citizen, scrutiny of government action.’47This 
requirement for the UK to send government environmental plans and reports to the EC 
– which plays a key role in ensure the appropriate application of EU laws as ‘guardian 
of the Treaties’ according to Article 17 of the TEU – will cease to apply post-Brexit,48 
and the consequential opportunity for the public to engage the government on their 
actions will be lost. This loss might be considered a bit significant, given that the 
participation platform is not just a national, but a regional one that provides for external 
and independent scrutiny of government actions by the EC together with public 
involvement at that level. And even though the UK may not be in breach legally of 
relevant obligations under the Aarhus Convention post-Brexit, this deterioration of 
participatory right and opportunity will be considered an action that did not promote the 
tenets of the Convention, but went against the spirit of the regime.  
Indeed, the Aarhus Convention Compliance Committee conceded (in a matter involving 
Hungary) that Article 3 (6) ‘did not… completely exclude a possibility of [a Party] 
reducing existing rights [and opportunities] as long as they did not fall below the level 
                                                            
43Ibid, Art 8. 
44 Art 3 (5) provides that: ‘The provisions of this Convention shall not affect the right of a Party to 
maintain or introduce measures providing for broader access to information, more extensive public 
participation in decision-making and wider access to justice in environmental matters than required by 
this Convention.’ 
45 Art 3 (6) provides that: ‘This Convention shall not require any derogation from existing rights of access 
to information, public participation in decision-making and access to justice in environmental matters.’ 
46 EBBESSON, J., GAUGITSCH, H., JENDROSKA, J., MARSHALL, F. and STEC, S., The Aarhus 
Convention: An Implementation Guide, 2nd ed., United Nations, 2014, p. 67. 
47 LEE, M. ‘Accountability for Environmental Standards after Brexit’ Environmental Law Review, vol. 
19, num. 2, 2017, pp. 89- 90. 
48Ibid. 






granted by the Convention.’49 The Committee nevertheless posited that the wordings of 
Articles 3 (6) and (5) taken together with Article 1,50 ‘indicate that such reduction was 
not generally perceived to be in line with the objective of the Convention.’51 So strongly 
the Committee felt about this that it recommended that the Meeting of Parties (MoP) 
should ‘urge Parties to refrain from taking any measure which would reduce existing 
[participatory] rights… even if such measures would not necessarily involve any breach 
of the Convention and should recommend to Parties having already reduced existing 
rights to keep the matter closely under review’52 (but the MoP did not act on the 
recommendation in its meeting that followed53). 
What is more, with Brexit, the UK will assume new law-making responsibilities 
concerning environmental issues over which the EU presently exercises legislative 
powers. Consequentially, the UK public will then have the opportunity of participating 
in law-making as it concerns the affected areas. ‘These powers [which are currently 
under the remit of the EU] are wide-ranging, and cover subjects as diverse as 
agriculture, air quality, chemicals, climate change, fisheries, protected areas and waste’; 
and the major approach of the EU in regulating these concerns is such that some of its 
legislation ‘applies directly, mostly without any discretion left to the Member States’ 
and others ‘generally set compulsory objectives for Member States, leaving them 
discretion in deciding how to comply.’54 These EU environmental laws are commonly 
made with very limited possibility for wide public input; for example, for possible 
participation in such a law-making process, the EU established a 32-member 
consultative committee on environmental affairs (made up of few representatives from 
environmental NGO and others handpicked by the EC.)55 
                                                            
49 Hungary ACCC/C/2004/4; ECE/MP.PP/C.1/2005/2/Add.4, 14 March 2005, para 18. 
50 Article 1 contains the Objective of the Convention thus: ‘In order to contribute to the protection of the 
right of every person of the present and future generations to live in an environment adequate to his or her 
health and well-being, each Party shall guarantee the rights of access to information, public participation 
in decision-making, and access to justice in environmental matters in accordance with the provisions of 
this Convention.’ 
51 Hungary, ob. cit., paras 17 and 18. 
52 Ibid, para 21. 
53 See for example, Report of the Second Meeting of the Parties to the Aarhus Convention, 
ECE/MP.PP/2005/2/Add.6 (decision II/5), 25-27 May 2005, para 3. 
54 ROGER, A. ‘Types of EU Environmental Legislation and Competence Allocation’ in CARDESA-
SALZMANN, A. and SAVARESI, A., ob. cit., p. 5. 
55 See EBBESSON, J. et al., ob. cit., p. 184; and EC Decision 97/150/EC of 24 February 1997. For what 
is arguably, to a limited extent, a contrast to this view in a special case, see: HEYVAERT, V., ‘Aarhus to 




But that will change for the UK post-Brexit, as participation at the EU level does not 
favourably compare with the relatively wider and more robust provision for public 
participation in law-making in the UK.56Unlike the EU procedure that is much farther 
from the public given its regional nature (which makes it administratively difficult, if 
not practically impossible, to traditionally allow for detailed and meaningful 
participation from the EU public), this UK procedure is closer to the people and 
comprises both informal and formal consultations/public hearings involving members of 
the public in general.57 
In fact, the current position of things in the UK (and indeed other EU countries), where 
the general public have no right or effective opportunity to meaningfully participate in 
the formation of EU laws and binding objectives with environmental implications that 
directly apply to their country, may arguably not be in compliance with Article 8 of the 
Aarhus Convention which obliges parties to ‘take concrete measures’58 to ensure that 
the public has a say in the making of laws that affect the environment. From the 
standpoint of the Aarhus Convention, it can be argued that this is a natural ‘Achilles 
heel’ of the EU (environmental) regulatory system, effective as some of its measure 
might have been. Thus, as it appears, Brexit carries with it the implication of giving the 
UK a chance for better compliance with its Article 8 obligation. And this is in tune with 
Lee’s caution against ‘too great a nostalgia’ as the UK leaves the EU considering the 
possibility for some positive change to UK environmental law which Brexit opens up.59 
Nonetheless, one should not overlook the subsidiarity issue which this future change – 
that is, the transfer of new environmental law-making powers from the EU to the UK – 
raises. Generally, according to the widely recognised ‘principle of subsidiarity’ 
(although many variations exist60), (environmental) decisions are best made and should 
                                                                                                                                                                              
Helsinki: Participation in Environmental Decision-Making on Chemicals’, in PALLEMAERTS, M. (ed), 
The Aarhus Convention at Ten: Interactions and Tensions between Conventional International Law and 
EU Environmental Law, Groningen: Europa Law Publishing, 2011, pp. 189 – 211. 
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be made at the lowest possible level of governance where they will be sufficiently 
effective.61Essentially, this principle, which bears similarity with that of ‘shared 
responsibility,’ is ‘not so much of a choice of action at one level to the exclusion of 
others but, rather, a mixing of actor and instruments at the appropriate levels.’62 It was 
partly on this basis that certain environmental decisions were left to EU member states, 
and others placed within the remit of EU lawmakers where the objectives of the 
required action cannot be sufficiently achieved by the member states but only at the EU 
level given the required scale and effects of the proposed action.63 The implementation 
of this ‘co-responsibility’ tool – in the words of the UNDP – is how one increases ‘the 
overall quality and effectiveness of the system of [environmental] governance, while 
increasing the authority and capacities of [lower authorities].’64 
Hence, it might arguably be more effective for the UK to have the free hand to legislate 
(with the meaningful participation of the public) on certain environmental issues with at 
most a negligible transboundary element to them, like urban noise or household waste, 
that have so far been partly legislated on by the EU.65 But then, the contrary is the case 
with respect to other environmental problems having a major transboundary character, 
such as climate change, ozone depletion and water pollution, which comparatively can 
better receive effective solution at the EU level, and not exclusively at the level of 
member states.66 This is so, given the harmonising force of the EU in an interconnected 
world that requires collective state action to effectively address many major 
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environmental challenges,67 apart from the fact that the EU takes a leading role in 
international negotiations on such areas as climate change.68 And while the UK will 
continue to have its choices and decisions (on transboundary issues) constrained by 
norms generated from other European platforms (such as the Council of Europe and the 
UN Economic Commission for Europe) and the provision of international 
environmental treaties,69 the arguably more effective EU power of constraint over its 
members would no longer apply to the UK. 
 
IV. ACCESS TO JUSTICE IN ENVIRONMENTAL MATTERS 
A vital element that has contributed over the years to effective environmental 
governance and protection in the UK is the opportunity its citizens have to call their 
government to account, through EU mechanisms, once it falls short on its 
environmental obligations under EU law. ‘Even when they become costly to implement, 
difficult to achieve or obstruct what have emerged as more important current priorities’, 
states must still adhere to EU environmental laws, otherwise, ‘there are means (slow 
and imperfect though they are) for using the [European] Court of Justice [of the 
European Union (CJEU)] to seek compliance.’70 Although, in this regard, individuals 
and private entities have no direct access to the ECJ, they can file a complaint with the 
EC which can commence an infringement proceeding before the CJEU against the state 
failing to comply with EU law.71 Indeed, about half of the actions in the CJEU 
instigated by the EC where initiated on the basis of public complaints sent to the EC 
about member states’ violation of EU Law.72 And, as with most EU member states, this 
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has helped the CJEU play a major role in protecting the UK environment from the 
actions of its government,73 and ensuring its compliance with procedural environmental 
norms.74 
Beyond having (indirect) access to the CJEU, when private entities approach a domestic 
court in the UK to enforce government compliance with EU-related environmental 
obligations, EU law ensures that they are not completely left alone to the dictates of the 
national legal system. In this regard, their right of access to justice is enhanced by the 
fact that the domestic court is bound to follow the judgement of the CJEU on the matter 
or, when in doubt as to the interpretation or validity of an EU law, ask the CJEU for 
guidance and clarification.75 The effect of this complementary role of the CJEU is 
exemplified in the case of R (ClientEarth) v Secretary of State for the Environment, 
Food and Rural Affairs,76 were the guidance provided by the CJEU assisted the national 
Supreme Court in holding that the UK government was in breach and must comply with 
its obligation under EU air quality law, contrary to the initial judgements of the UK 
High Court and Court of Appeal.77 
However, post-Brexit, this vital EU regional platform for accessing justice in 
environmental matters will no longer be available to the UK public as it will lose its 
jurisdiction over the country.78 The CJEU’s complementary role in assisting national 
courts will also cease, despite the UK’s intention to retain applicable EU environmental 
laws. While in this regard the UK government appears glad to ‘take back control of our 
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laws’,79the environmental implication of foreclosing the public’s right of access to this 
regional court is quite significant. Principle 10 of the Rio Declaration 1992,80 which is 
widely adopted,81 clearly supports the point that effective access to judicial proceedings 
‘at the relevant level’ is vital for adequately addressing environmental issues. More so, 
improving access to justice and environmental dispute resolution is obviously critical 
for realising the UN’s 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development82 and the Sustainable 
Development Goals (SDGs),83 particularly SDG Goal 16 – ‘to provide access to justice 
for all and build effective, accountable and inclusive institutions at all levels.’84 
Arguably, the relevant levels for effective environmental protection and dispute 
resolution, broadly speaking, are tripartite in nature – the national, regional and 
international levels. And it is quite worrisome that the UK public will have the regional 
aspect of their right of access to justice significantly whittled down as a result of Brexit. 
Indeed, whilst the UK public can still resort to national courts to hold the government 
accountable with respect to the latter’s environmental commitments, national courts 
have their limitations in this regard (and this is partly why supranational courts are 
relevant). For instance, Reid has demonstrated how ‘[t]he debates and uncertainty about 
the status and enforceability of … specific and legally binding greenhouse gas reduction 
targets in the [UK] Climate Change Acts show the difficulties in calling governments to 
account within the domestic legal structures.’85 Its neutral and independent scrutiny, and 
its detachment from the political structures and dynamic of the UK or any other state, 
are some of the vital protective features which the CJEU brings to the table. In addition, 
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the CJEU can mandate a government in breach of environmental law to pay fines until 
the compliance issues are resolved86 – this effective remedial and deterrence tool is 
unavailable to domestic courts in the UK. Given that the existing UK legal structures 
may be ineffective in filling the void that would be left by the CJEU, commentators are 
calling on the UK to ‘explore new avenues to ensure better law enforcement’87 post-
Brexit. According to Busch QC: 
post-Brexit much thought will require to be given… to procedural matters, 
including in particular those relating to the means of securing compliance with the 
requirements of EU law and challenging instances of non-compliance. This in turn 
is likely to give rise to collateral issues concerning, for instance, issues of standing, 
and of course the costs of environmental litigation.88 
Even where the UK holds under international law similar environmental responsibilities 
to those within EU law, compliance mechanisms at that level – such as the International 
Court of Justice – hardly provides ample opportunity for action by non-state entities 
against a state compared to the right of access private entities have under EU law.89 
Even where private entities can approach an international compliance mechanism with 
respect to environmental dispute, again, unlike the CJEU: it is either the mechanism has 
the weaknesses of a lack of mandatory jurisdiction and a confidential procedure, as is 
the case with the Permanent Court of Arbitration with regards to its Optional Rules for 
Arbitration of Disputes Relating to Natural Resources and/or the Environment which it 
launched in 2001;90 or, its decisions are merely recommendatory and non-binding like 
those of the Aarhus Convention Compliance Committee.91 
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Nevertheless, the above gloomy picture of the future status of the UK public’s right to 
access justice at supra-national levels in an environmental context, does not represent 
the entire image of ‘tomorrow’ in this regard. Beyond the CJEU and the Aarhus 
Convention Compliance Committee, the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR), 
established under the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR),92 provides a ray 
of hope. Importantly, individuals have direct access to the ECtHR (although, only after 
exhausting domestic judicial remedies), ‘without any domestic or international 
intermediary’,93 for the purpose of holding state parties accountable even in matters 
pertaining to the environment.94 Indeed, it is widely recognised,95 including under the 
Aarhus Convention,96 that environmental rights, especially its procedural aspects, are 
intrinsically linked to certain traditional human right norms. This point the ECtHR has 
demonstrated in several cases – such as McGinley and Egan v United Kingdom97 and 
Taskin v Turkey98 – showing that established human right norms can and does 
constitute, to an extent, an alternative route for the public to assert their procedural 
environmental rights in the least. 
Whilst it has been clearly argued that Brexit will lead to a loss within the domestic legal 
system of the UK of a stronger remedy against acts violating ECHR rights in procedural 
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environmental matters,99 in light of the above analysis, the UK public can continue even 
after Brexit to fully explore the regional ECtHR judicial platform in asserting their 
environmental procedural rights. The latter position is so, giving that the UK is party to 
the ECHR and that this status will not be directly affected by its exit from the EU, as the 
latter is a different institution from the Council of Europe that adopted and is 
responsible for the ECHR. That said, an issue of concern is that since being a signatory 
to the ECHR is a requirement for EU membership, Brexit does remove a key obstacle to 
the UK withdrawing from the ECHR.100 This concern is not unfounded. The British 
Prime Minister, Theresa May, and the UK Conservative party feels that the UK may 
need to reconsider its membership of the ECHR in the future, after the conclusion of 
Brexit, perhaps, in order to retain at home more decision-making powers.101 Therefore, 
civil society must continue to pressure both this and successive UK governments to 
drop any idea of withdrawing from the ECHR considering the major restriction that 
such an action will further place on the public’s right to hold their government to 
account in environmental matters. In addition to the above, it has also been well noted 
that Brexit will. 
 
V. SOME CROSS-CUTTING ISSUES 
Beyond the specific implications of Brexit for the individual pillars of procedural 
environmental rights elucidated above, UK exit from the EU may have some further 
effects or raise some pertinent concerns that generally cut across the various pillars. 
One of the concerns which Brexit raises relates to the impact of devolution on the 
development of procedural environmental laws within the UK. Here, ‘devolution’ 
means that certain powers or competences are reserved to be exercised by the various 
component nations of the UK – England, Scotland, Wales, and Northern Island – and 
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this has been a part of governance in the UK for many years now.102 The ‘environment’ 
is however one of the specific areas where power is devolved and the various 
component nations are free to legislate on it, albeit subject to the framework established 
by EU environmental law on the subject-matter.103 Therefore, while there may be some 
differences in the (procedural) environmental laws of each of the devolved 
administrations, the scale of divergence is limited and at a healthy level because of the 
harmonising force of EU law, as anything done by the devolved authorities in breach of 
EU framework on a subject is invalid.104 Thus, the existing level of coordination and 
harmony in UK environmental law in general is, to a sizable extent, a result of the EU 
influence. 
However, this will no longer be the case post-Brexit. The various devolved units will 
largely be legally free to develop their laws relating to the environment in 
fundamentally different ways and directions.105 To be sure, ‘[p]roviding the room for 
difference is, of course, one of the major justifications for and benefits of devolution…, 
but too much disparity and fragmentation can have negative consequences.’106 Such 
major divergence in law and policy could arise from the fact that the different 
component nations have distinct views on environment issues, or in response to new 
problems, or even as a consequence of the nations’ different administrative structures, 
etc.107 For example they could: vary the timescale for response to a request for 
environmental information; develop varying scopes on the proposed activities to which 
public participation should apply in their decision-making processes; and the current 
difference in rules as regards access to justice in environmental matter in England and 
Wale on the one hand, and Scotland on the other hand, could be further widened. Such 
sharp distinctions in regulations could possibly create complication, for instance, when 
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dealing with cross-border issues. Hopefully, this will be a good reason to maintain some 
‘continued coordination and cooperation… [b]ut mechanisms for this must be 
established.’108 Yet, overall, the risk of losing some environmental benefits of the 
largely integrated and coordinated regulation experienced by the UK under the EU 
system, remains. 
More than that, the likely increased variations in the procedural environmental laws of 
the devolved units raises some concerns as to whether the UK could be held non-
compliant with the Aarhus Convention. Parties are obliged under Article 3 (1) of the 
Convention to ‘maintain and establish a clear… and consistent framework to implement 
the [Convention]’.109In fact, in a case concerning Croatia,110certain laws on public 
participation that appeared to be in compliance with Article 7 of the Convention (which 
they sought to implement) were not consistent as to when public participation should 
take place with regards to certain plans.111 On this ground, the Aarhus Convention 
Compliance Committee held that Croatia ‘failed to provide for a consistent and uniform 
application throughout the territory and is not clear as regards public participation… 
and therefore is not in compliance with [Article 3(1)].’112 Should such a perspective be 
applicable to the UK post-Brexit, it will be unable to successfully use its internal power-
sharing arrangement as an excuse for breach. This is because the Compliance 
Committee (relying on Article 27 of the 1969 Vienna Convention) has held in a matter 
concerning Belgium,113 that a Party cannot ‘invoke its internal laws… including internal 
divisions of powers’ as an excuse for not complying with the Convention.114 
Going by existing rules and procedure in the UK, it does appear that such a situation 
may not be easy to resolve amiably between the UK and the devolved governments, 
unless a new coping mechanism is developed to address the issue. Reid puts it clearly: 
[I]n contrast to the position with EU matters, the devolved authorities are not 
legally prohibited from acting in ways incompatible with international law. Instead 
compatibility with international obligations is ensured through the powers of the 
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Secretary of State to intervene. In order to prevent such incompatibility, s/he can 
prevent Bills going for Royal Assent, revoke subordinate legislation or direct that 
any other action is, or is not taken by the devolved administrations. This means that 
any disagreements are not calmed through resolution by the courts, but require 
political intervention which is likely only to exacerbate the dispute.115 
Considering the above potential challenges that will unravel with a sharp differentiation 
of laws within the UK if devolved powers being ‘repatriated’ from the EU post-Brexit is 
not properly managed, the governments of the UK and devolved administrations have 
agreed on the need for new ‘common frameworks’ that will ensure regulatory 
consistency and coordination in some areas (like EU law does).116 It is however not 
clear if, or the extent to which this new ‘common framework’, when developed, will 
prevent a radical divergence in UK (procedural) environmental law as, according to 
Paun, ‘the devil will be in the detail.’117 
Another related cross-cutting concern which Brexit raises is the possibility of a slow-
down in the development of procedural environmental rights in the UK. As noted 
earlier, UK environmental law has on the whole witnessed significant, quick and 
positive transformation since the UK joined the EU. This has come about by the 
implementation of innovative EU environmental obligations in diverse areas including 
as it relates to public access to environmental information,118 among others. But while it 
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breakthrough-devolved-nations. The responses of some of the devolved governments to this idea of new 
‘common frameworks’ although generally positive, maintains the uncertainty. According to the Welsh 
government, the need for such ‘common frameworks’ is recognised ‘[i]n some cases’. Welsh 
Government, ‘Securing Wale’s Future: Transiting from the European Union to a New Relationship with 
Europe’ (The Welsh Government and Plaid Cymru, 2017) 26. For Scotland, there is acceptance that 
‘some common approaches’ will be needed across the UK post-Brexit. Michael Russell, ‘Minister for UK 
Negotiations on Scotland’s Place in Europe – Statement to Parliament’, 12 September 2017, available at: 
https://beta.gov.scot/publications/eu-withdrawal-bill-ministers-speech/. Also, Wales and Scotland take the 
firm position that such ‘common frameworks’ are ‘a matter for negotiation and agreement between the 
governments concerned, not for imposition from Westminster’ and they need to ‘be based on common 
consent’. Respectively: Scottish Government, ‘Scotland’s Place in Europe’ (The Scottish Government, 
December 2016) 41; and Welsh Government, ibid, 28. Moreover, ‘while the UK and devolved 
governments agree on the overarching principles, there is no consensus yet on how the principles will be 
interpreted and where therefore frameworks will in practice be required.’ PAUN, A. ob. cit. 
118 See the EC Directive 2003/4/EC of 28 January 2003 on public access to environmental information 
(OJ L41/26), implemented in the UK by the Environmental Information Regulation 2004 (No. 3391), and 
the Environmental Information (Scotland) Regulations 2004 (No. 520). 






may be conceded that procedural rights in the UK would have changed significantly 
since the 1970s even without becoming an EU member state,119 Reid, in evidence given 
to the UK House of Commons Environmental Audit Committee, takes the frank 
position that‘[t]he UK’s membership of the EU has ensured environmental action was 
taken on a faster timetable and more thoroughly than would otherwise have been the 
case.’120 This was largely achieved by EU pressure mechanisms which will to a large 
extent no longer be applicable to the UK post-Brexit.  
What is more, with Brexit comes the risk of increased instability and vulnerability of 
procedural environmental rights to national pressures and politics, and perhaps, on a 
positive note, some opportunity for quicker and better targeted responses to changing 
environmental circumstances within the UK. Reid clearly captures this ‘fluid’ future: 
It may take a frustratingly long time for laws to emerge from the EU, and then to be 
implemented by all the Member States, but once made they [usually] stick around. 
They are not as vulnerable to the short-term pressures of national politics as 
domestic legislation. The difficulty of revision [even though EU environmental law 
could sometime change rapidly] can mean that desirable improvements are not 
[easily] made, but the fact that the laws are not subject to constant chopping and 
changing [like national law] has its advantages. In particular, the stability of EU law 
[compared to national law in general] is well suited to tackling major environmental 
problems… where long term programmes and investments are needed to achieve 
substantial results. The… stability of environmental standards enables industry and 
investors to plan ahead and allows for the integration of different policy areas to be 
developed. The greater scope for rapid change that would follow Brexit brings both 
the advantages and disadvantages of flexibility, with the potential to respond more 




The above analysis strongly suggests that the UK’s exit from the EU will have a 
profound impact on procedural environmental rights in the UK. Spectacularly, and quite 
unexpectedly, the study revealed that some existing rights (apart from those applicable 
                                                            
119 REID, C. T., ob. cit., p. 412. 
120House of Commons Environmental Audit Committee ob. cit., p. 8. 
121 REID, C. T., ob. cit., 412 - 413. 




within the UK which will be retained after Brexit) may be maintained post-Brexit, such 
as the right of the UK public to access environmental held by EU institutions. The 
article also showed that Brexit could open new possibilities and opportunities for 
improved public involvement, like the public right to participate in environmental law-
making processes particularly with respect to new law-making powers that will be 
‘repatriated’ back to the UK from the EU. And this could arguably mean better 
compliance by the UK with its Aarhus Convention obligations in that regard. 
However, the article found that Brexit majorly creates risks, challenges and uncertain 
for the future of procedural environmental rights in the UK, in terms of: the loss of EU 
administrative and judicial mechanisms for holding the UK government accountable for 
its environmental actions and omissions; the risk of extensive fragmentation and 
divergence in participation rights and opportunities with the return of some EU powers 
to devolved administrations; the potential for a slow-down in the development of 
procedural rights; the possibility of the lowering of standards in the implementation of 
Aarhus Convention rights domestically; the risk of violating the letter and spirit of the 
Aarhus Convention with the general degradation of procedural rights post-Brexit,  
among others.  
No doubt, what is required to ensure a stable and progressive procedural environmental 
rights regime in the UK post-Brexit is beyond the current welcomed, but insufficient, 
move to retain presently applicable EU legal measures through the European Union 
(Withdrawal) Bill. The UK would need to move fast with respect to making new laws 
(where there was no domestic legislation) transposing relevant directly applicable EU 
laws in order to avoid the risk of regulatory uncertainty or lacuna. Also, to plug the 
accountability loop hole – to an extent – that will be created by the severance of relevant 
EU administrative and judicial mechanisms from the UK environmental governance 
structure, relatively domestic institutional adjustments need to be made and effective 
alternatives developed as earlier alluded to. In this light, among other measures, serious 
consideration needs to be given to creating an independent, expert body with some form 
of sanctioning powers for the purpose of scrutinising, with public involvement, 
government environmental actions and omissions.122 
Additionally, the UK government must do everything possible to ensure that the current 
plan for a new arrangement between the various devolved administration to guarantee 
                                                            
122 See LEE, M., ob. cit., p. 90. 






continued coordination and cooperation in environmental regulation, in order to prevent 
extreme divergence and fragmentation in approach, is fruitful and robust. Overall, more 
than ever before, the post-Brexit era would require a more active, dynamic and vigilant 
civil society to keep the pressure on government to ensure that procedural 
environmental rights neither lag behind international and regional best practices, nor are 
lowered in standard due to political or other considerations. 
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